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Abstract 
Between 1962 and 1967, Egypt launched a large-scale military intervention to support the 
government of the newly formed Yemen Arab Republic. Some 70,000 Egyptian military 
personnel and hundreds of civilian advisors were deployed with the stated aim to ‘modernize 
Yemeni institutions’ and ‘bring Yemen out of the Middle Ages.’ This article tells the story of 
this significant top-down and externally-driven transformation, focusing on changes in the 
military and formal government administration in the Yemen Arab Republic and drawing on 
hitherto unavailable Egyptian archival material. Highlighting both the significant ambiguity 
in the Egyptian state-building project itself, as well as the unintended consequences that 
ensued as Egyptian plans collided with existing power structures; it traces the impact of 
Egyptian intervention on new state institutions, their modes of functioning, and the 
articulation of these ‘modern’ institutions, particularly the military and new central 
ministries, with established tribal and village-based power structures.  
1. Introduction  
On the night of 26 September 1962, a column of T-34 tanks trundled through the streets of 
Sana‗a and surrounded the palace of the new Imam of Yemen, Mu ammad al-Badr,2 who had 
succeeded his father Imam ‘  mad (r.1948-62) only one week earlier. Opening fire shortly 
before midnight, the Yemeni Free Officers announced the ‗26 September Revolution‘ on 
Radio Sana‗a and declared the formation of a new state: the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). 
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2 
Drawing on support from a domestic coalition of military officers, ‗Aden-based traders and 
trade-unionists, reformist Imamate officials, and tribal leaders the Imam had antagonised, the 
revolution was also supported by ‗ bd al-Nasser‘s Egypt  which had encouraged plots 
against the Imam and supported opposition to his rule since the 1950s.
3
 Once the formation of 
the YAR had been declared, Egypt rapidly deployed troops and experts to Yemen.  
Within little more than a week after the overthrow of the Imam, 3,000 Egyptian soldiers had 
arrived in Yemen. After three months, there were 15,000, flanked by growing numbers of 
civilian advisors. One year after the Imam was overthrown, some 50,000 Egyptian soldiers 
and 300 civilian advisors were in Yemen, that is one Egyptian soldier for every 100 Yemenis 
and one advisor for every 10 Yemeni civil servants.
4
 The Egyptian military presence 
continued to grow to reach 70,000 soldiers and an extensive intelligence apparatus by the 
summer of 1965, supported by up to 400 civilian advisors, including managers, experts and 
teachers  before it ended in the autumn of 1967  after Egypt‘s defeat in the Six-Day War. 
Between 1962 and 1967, Egyptian experts in Yemen were engaged in everything from 
building and running ministries and hospitals, to teaching students, from overseeing road 
construction, to reconfiguring local administration.
5
 They explicitly touted Egyptian 
models—within a short time, Egyptian officers trained thousands of Yemeni volunteer 
soldiers and conscripts according to Egyptian manuals, teachers introduced the Egyptian 
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curriculum in schools, and experts re-organised ministries according to the organigrammes of 
their Egyptian counterparts.  
Surprisingly little has been written about this significant top-down and externally-driven 
transformation, perhaps the most dramatic of Egypt‘s extensive efforts at promoting 
revolution and regime-change across the Arab world during the Nasserist era. Despite the 
unparalleled scope of the Egyptian deployment in Yemen, the commanding importance of 
Egyptian officers and secondees in Yemeni politics, and the centrality of the Yemen debacle 
for Egyptian regional and domestic politics of the 1960s  ―little research has been conducted 
on seconded Egyptians‘ involvement in Yemen throughout this period.‖6 This is true both of 
Egyptian historiography, which, when it has discussed the Egyptian presence in Yemen, has 
generally focused on military issues and Saudi-Egyptian summit diplomacy,
7
 and of writing 
on Yemen itself.
8
 To address this relative blind-spot, the chapter draws on hitherto 
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unexplored documents from the Egyptian National Archives (ENA). As recently as 2012, 
Jesse Ferris identified ―the closure of the relevant Egyptian archives to researchers,‖ as a 
major obstacle;
9
 and the consulted documents provide a far more granular perspective on 
Egypt‘s presence in Yemen than hitherto available.10 The chapter also draws on interviews, 
memoirs, journalistic accounts of the war, and other archival material.
11
  
The chapter proceeds in three sections. In section two, it lays-out the models and interests at 
play in Egyptian state-building
12
 in Yemen. It highlights the simultaneous existence in 
Egyptian plans of ostensibly neutral, technocratic and developmentalist objectives, with a 
desire for political control and to recoup sunk costs. Section three then examines the impact 
of the Egyptian intervention on the YAR military, while section four explores its impact on 
public administration. Both sections three and four highlight the ways in which 
(contradictory) Egyptian plans collided in practice with existing, Imamate-era, military and 
administrative institutions and power structures in Yemen and trace how this collision shaped 
the emerging institutions in decisive ways. The result was a politically activist officer corps 
heading a weak military closely interwoven with tribal lines of identification, on the one 
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hand, and a public administration structured around external rents and their allocation on the 
other. As such, the chapter argues that although the outcomes did not resemble the blueprints, 
this period of contested top-down change decisively shaped Yemeni institutions in ways not 
adequately reflected in current scholarship.
 
  
2. State-Building and the Egyptian Model on offer 
Before going further, it is worth exploring  briefly  the ‗model‘ that Egyptian state-building 
exported and how it was shaped by the regional and domestic context in which both its 
‗export‘ from Egypt and its ‗import‘ to Yemen took place. The discussion highlights that the 
reforms spearheaded by the Egyptian military and civilian presence were animated by a 
particular vision for Yemen, shaped by historically contingent and contested discourses about 
the functions of states and the boundaries between ‗state‘ and ‗society.‘13 The Egyptian 
project in the YAR was coded both in technocratic terms as a universalist modernising 
project and in terms of the Nasserist political lexicon as a progressive political endeavour 
‗against imperialism and reaction.‘ At the same time, Egyptian policy towards Yemen 
developed ad-hoc in response to conflict within the Egyptian regime, mission creep, and 
increasing fiscal pressures. The Egyptian model on offer exhibited contradictory elements: it 
was both an ideological vision for Yemen as well as a self-interested hegemony—a project 
for strengthening the Yemeni military and keeping it under control, for creating strong, 
autonomous institutions and preventing their independence.   
                                                 
13
 On 20
th
 century imaginations of the state more generally see: Bob Jessop, ―Bringing the State Back In (Yet 
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For the most part, the Egyptian papers frame state-building in Yemen as a technocratic and 
universalist undertaking: Egyptian experts were charged by their government with combating 
‗ignorance and backwardness ‘ ―raising the level of administration in Yemen ‖14 developing 
strong institutions, and taking ―Yemen out of the Middle  ges.‖15 In a context where rival 
Cold War blocs advanced competing, but structurally similar versions of modernization 
theory, central planning, and ‗high modernism‘ as the preferred modes of development,16 
Egyptian experts offered modernity in the ostensibly neutral guise of armies with ranks and 
uniforms that marched in step, and centralised bureaucracies that followed procedures and 
produced statistics. In line with these aims, it is clear from the Egyptian archives that the 
Foreign Ministry took care in selecting secondees with specific required skills, qualifications, 
and experience.
17
  
Yet, the modernity on offer was recognisably Egyptian, since ―Nasser envisioned a Yemeni 
state that would be controlled from Cairo and would mirror the United Arab Republic in 
many aspects from its constitution to the format of its postal stamps.‖18 In this sense, 
elements of the Egyptian project coded as political tracked domestic Egyptian and regional 
conflicts or touched upon points of contention between rival Cold War blocs. Nasser‘s 
attempts domestically to eliminate an autonomous bourgeoisie and the creation of the Arab 
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Socialist Union in parallel to the state bureaucracy, were echoed in inconsistently-pursued 
policies against traditional elites in Yemen
19
 and a brief and unsuccessful attempt to create a 
single party under President al-Sallāl.20 Egyptian nationalisation policies were echoed in the 
creation of joint Egyptian-Yemeni public enterprises, dominated by their Egyptian parent 
companies.
21
 Yet, although Egyptian officials in Yemen, from Nasser down, consistently 
appealed to  rab nationalism and the struggle against ‗imperialism and reaction ‘22 and the 
goal of driving the British from ‗Aden enjoyed widespread support in north Yemen,23 the 
Egyptians were never able to establish a monopoly on the language of Arab nationalism. The 
Egyptian documents highlight a persistent fear that the Ba‘thists and Qawmiyin were 
ideologically ascendant and plotting against them.
24
 
Other Egyptian policies in Yemen appear animated by more prosaic concerns. The hope of 
defusing internal disagreements between Nasser and ‗ bd al-Hakim ‗ mer25 and of 
compensating on the international stage for the ignominious break-up of the United Arab 
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Republic (UAR) of September 1961,
26
 appear to have played an important role in the 
decision to intervene. Once the intervention was under-way, fears that a coup, like that which 
put an end to the UAR, might occur in Yemen, likewise appear to have influenced Egyptian 
policies.
27
 From the initial imposition of ‗ bd al-Ra man al-Bay ani as vice-president—a 
figure so close to Anwar al-Sadat, he was still denying rumours he was his brother in law 40 
years later
28—to the importance placed on control of Yemeni politicians, the military and 
new civilian institutions, the Egyptian state-building project was as much about preventing an 
embarrassing Yemeni escape from the Egyptian bear-hug as about exporting ‗modernity‘ in 
the guise of Egyptian organisational forms and revolutionary ideology. Finally, Egyptian 
domestic economic difficulties also meant that tensions between securing the revolution at 
home and diverting resources to Yemen loomed large for the Egyptian leadership,
29
 finding 
expression in policies vacillating between developmentalist initiatives to build hospitals and 
schools and the hard-nosed imposition of Egyptian monopolies and an undervalued exchange 
rate designed to squeeze money from the Yemen adventure.  
The following two sections explore how these contradictory elements in Egyptian blueprints 
interacted with existing power structures in Yemen. Each explores, in turn, the extent to 
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which the ‗official‘ technocratic plans for Yemeni modernisation were implemented  before 
turning to their more complex outcomes and institutional legacies.   
3. Egyptian intervention and the development of the YAR military  
Egyptian-Yemeni military cooperation pre-dated the Egyptian intervention. Imam ‘  mad 
and his father, Imam Yahyā (r.1918-48), had both repeatedly sought outside expertise to 
modernise the military, including from former Ottoman officers and Iraqi and Egyptian 
military missions, fearing threats to their rule from domestic competitors, Saudi Arabia in the 
North, and Britain in the South. At the same time, the Imams recognised the potential for 
instability emanating from such missions: Iraqi-trained officers had played an important role 
in the 1948 coup against Imam Yahyā30 and although Imam ‘  mad invited an Egyptian 
military mission to Yemen in 1954, he shut it down in 1955. He—or rather his son, Crown 
Prince Mu ammad—invited a second mission in 1957, but again cut off cooperation in 1959, 
when the Imam believed it to have been implicated in unrest in the military.
31
  
As a result, the impact of these missions was limited and localised in specific units. Overall, 
the Imamate military until 1962 remained organised along the lines Imam Yahyā had 
instituted post -independence, drawing on Ottoman military organisation and with blurred 
lines between tribal and royal troops. It appears that the Yemeni military consisted of a 
standing army (jaysh al-nidh mī) of 20,000 soldiers, reserves (jaysh al-dif ‘ī) of 30,000, a 
large tribal militia (jaysh al-bar nī), and additional special guards for the Imam, princes and 
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governors numbering another 5,000 soldiers.
32
 Yet, these numbers may be misleading, as 
poor records and an absence of statistics mean that there is uncertainty about the size and 
structure of the military on the eve of the revolution.
33
 Moreover, the Imam‘s military had 
only about 400 officers with formal military training in the early 1960s and much of the army 
was spread across the country in small units engaged in tax-collection and policing.
34
 Finally, 
the military fractured in the first months of the 1962 civil war. For example, most members of 
the jaysh al-dif ‘ī appear to have deserted and returned to their tribes, while units of the 
nidh mī army stationed north and east of Sana‗a largely joined the royalists.35 By most 
accounts, this left between 4,000 and 7,000 soldiers in the early republican military.
36
  
3.1 Modernising the military…  
After the overthrow of the Imam, the Egyptians invested heavily in the Republican military. 
Large-scale organisational restructuring along Egyptian lines, training by Egyptian officers, 
and new Egyptian-supplied uniforms and equipment clearly reflect an effort to remake the 
Yemeni military according to an Egyptian blueprint and to ‗yemenise‘ the conflict, thus 
reducing the cost in lives and treasure of the Egyptian intervention. Yet, these policies were 
tempered by fears of losing political control to an army too powerful or independent to 
manage effectively.  
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In theory—though highly unevenly in practice—the Republican state introduced mandatory 
military service and regularised recruitment, with a system of training that differentiated 
between enlisted men and officers and between different functions.
37
 Three months after the 
overthrow of the Imam, in December 1962, the Egyptians also built a new military academy, 
which remained for a decade or more  the ―largest and most exclusive building in Sana‗a.‖ 
By the time the Egyptian military retreated in the autumn of 1967, around 10,000 Yemenis 
had gone through some form of Egyptian-led military training and most of the elite Yemeni 
paratrooper and commando units had completed training in Egypt.
38
  
The UAR also provided direct support to Yemeni military procurement and wages. 
According to figures from the Egyptian archives, Egyptian loans and grants to the YAR 
military amounted to some 100 million Yemeni riyals across the five years.
39
 Based on likely 
estimates for state income and expenditure, this Egyptian support accounts for about half of 
all Yemeni government expenditure over this period and for well over 90% of the defence 
budget.
40
 Egyptian budget support for the military allowed a large increase of soldiers‘ 
salaries immediately after the overthrow of the Imam, and improvements in enlisted men‘s 
standard of living
41—but also led to growing divisions between military officials, who were 
paid regularly, and civilian bureaucrats, who were not.
42
 In addition, the Egyptians, who at 
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this point controlled most communication by Arab governments with the Soviet Union, 
facilitated Soviet support for Yemen.
43
 
Although tracing the Egyptian-led expansion of the Yemeni military is made difficult by the 
absence of a clear baseline, discussed above, its growth in size and responsibilities during the 
period of Egyptian intervention is clear, though hardly rapid. Starting from somewhere 
between 4,000 and 7,000 soldiers in 1962, the republican military grew to about 7,000 
soldiers by the beginning of 1965 and reached just under 10,000 soldiers by mid-1967.
44
 
Initially deployed only in guard duties, the Yemeni military began being used in combat after 
summer 1964, and was provided with Egyptian air support and weapons.
45
 According to the 
German embassy in Ta‗iz, writing in mid-1964: 
The republican military is making noticeable gains in its composition as well as its 
training and numbers. The units that have now returned from training in Egypt are elite 
troops and, in combination with some of the units trained in Yemen, promise to form 
the backbone of the army.
46
 
In addition, the military gained new unit and rank structures based on the Egyptian model, 
with much greater differentials in pay between officers and enlisted men than under the 
Imamate.
47
 Marching in Egyptian uniforms and carrying Egyptian supplies, while presenting 
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Soviet weapons supplied via the UAR,
48
 the republican military was in important ways an 
Egyptian creation.  nd while the Imam‘s army possessed only the first outlines of a 
professional officer corps, the Egyptians left behind an officer corps flush with new prestige, 
technical skills, status, and political aspirations,
49
 whose political influence was reflected, not 
least, in the quasi-autonomous status the military gained during this time.
50
 
3.2 …and its impact 
Despite these changes, growth did not meet plans formulated by Yemeni politicians or the 
requirements of the war effort, and the expansion of the Yemeni military outlined above, at 
most from 4,000 to slightly less than 10,000 troops over the course of five years, was hardly 
impressive given the resources dedicated to the purpose. Indeed, as the Egyptians prepared to 
leave Yemen, the Egyptian ambassador  ‗ bd al-Ra man ‘  mad  alā , noted: ― fter five 
years […] we did not succeed in making the Yemenis able to defend themselves.‖51 As 
highlighted in section two, this was not merely a question of poor implementation, but may 
have been the Egyptian ‗model‘ on offer: political control of the military loomed large in 
concerns of the Egyptian command. Tensions within the Egyptian state-building project and 
the interaction between Egyptian plans and pre-existing power-centres in Yemen shaped the 
military that emerged and its position within Yemeni politics.  
In a context where the Egyptian military presence seemed to guarantee the safety of the 
Republic against the Royalists, Yemeni political leaders and particularly President al-Sallāl 
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(r.1962-7) often appear more invested in coup-proofing the armed forces than turning them 
into an effective fighting force. Surrounded by Egyptian troops and consistently agitating for 
a larger Egyptian role in Yemen, al- Sallāl appears to have paid lip-service only to the 
technocratic project of military growth and professionalization. Instead, he channelled 
support to his special guard, which grew to some 3,000 troops, or between half and a third of 
the regular military, provided widely-quoted figures on its size during this period are 
accurate.
52
 In addition, al-Sallāl spearheaded major purges of the officer corps, particularly in 
October 1966, when the dismissal of more than 40 officers on 6 October marked the opening 
gambit in a month of mass arrests, dismissals and executions.
53
 During this time, al-Sallāl 
transferred authority for public order policing to the Egyptians, and Egyptian troops made 
more than 2,000 arrests and suspended as many as 200 officers in the last week of October 
1966 alone.
54
 The October arrests themselves were the culmination of a several month 
standoff between President al-Sallāl and the Republican Council members ‗ bd al-Ra man 
al-‘Iryān   ‘  mad Nu‗mān  and  assan al-‗ mr , which began when Egyptian troops 
secured the return of the embattled al-Sallāl to Yemen in July against the express wishes of 
al-‘Iryān   Nu‗mān, and al-‗ mr ; and ended with their imprisonment along with other 
leading Yemeni politicians.
55
  
As the Egyptian military‘s involvement in al-Sallāl‘s return in summer 1966 and the arrests 
of October 1966 illustrate, concerns about coup-proofing the military, keeping it weak and 
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divided if necessary, not only animated elements of the Yemeni leadership, but Egyptian 
thinking as well. Well before tensions between President al-Sallāl and other leading 
republicans came to a head in the second half of 1966, the Egyptian command had taken 
measures to limit the size and independence of the Yemeni military. When ‘  mad 
Nu‗mān‘s appointment as Prime Minister in April 1965 raised the spectre of greater 
republican independence, the Egyptian command refused disbursement of funds that had 
been earmarked for the expansion of the Yemeni army and turned down a joint Soviet–
East German offer to train and supply the Yemeni military and increase its strength to 
18,000.
56
  
While controlling the growth of the military, Egyptian intelligence kept a very close watch on 
Yemeni officers—perhaps drawing lessons from its experience with the UAR—and sought to 
create a politicised and pro-Egyptian body. When the the Egyptian command disagreed with 
decisions of the Yemeni government, Egyptian military advisors agitated for Yemeni officers 
to oppose the measures in question.
57
 In at least one instance, an Egyptian took direct control 
of YAR forces in support of one Yemeni government faction against another.58 Egyptian 
experts also encouraged officers to view themselves as the vanguard of Arab nationalism and 
modernisation
59
 and Egyptian changes to the local administration, discussed in the next 
section, promoted officers to positions of civilian responsibility. More broadly, their military 
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expertise at a time of war strengthened officers‘ hand vis-à-vis civilian politicians.60 Officers 
were a privileged target of Egyptian training and funding and were well-represented in 
cabinet roles throughout the war.  
Finally, the Egyptian military model interacted with political and tribal divisions in Yemen. 
Specific resentment of tribal lines of divisions colours the general lament of the state of the 
Yemeni military in this report by the Egyptian embassy in Ta‗iz:  
The soldiers don‘t have the discipline or military precision to implement attacks and the 
orders of their leaders, and most of them are stationed in their local areas [bil d] or 
tribes. The officers receive the salaries of the soldiers. What is more, they take payment 
from the tribes… [The soldiers] flee from the units and sell ammunition, equipment, 
and weapons for their own gain.
61
 
As the above quote suggests, many recruits in the new Yemeni military came from tribes, 
particularly the minor tribes around Sana‗a62 and tribesmen in the military repeatedly 
responded to calls for mobilisation from their tribe, sometimes abandoning their military unit 
to fight in tribal conflicts or opting out of battles, which would have pitted them against 
members of their own tribe.
63
 Moreover, many officers came from sheikhly families and 
headed military units composed of members of their tribe—often stationed in their region of 
origin. Control of such units from Sana‗a was tenuous. As the memoirs of ‗Abd Allah al-
‘  mar, paramount sheikh of the  āshid confederation during this time, make clear, 
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operations by officers like Colonel Mujāhid ‘Abu Shawārib were commanded from Khamr in 
 āshid, rather than Sana‗a.64 Similarly, the forces directly commanded by  ussayn al-Dafa‗ , 
the Minister of Defence from 1963-1966, consisted largely of members of his Dh  
Mu ammad tribe, while the tribal militias of al- adā‘ and al-Si ār tribes were commanded 
by Major Mu ammad ‗Abd Allah and Colonel ‗Abd Allah  ussayn —both of them officers 
in the regular army.
65
  
These cross-connections and alliances, together with fears over royalist infiltration,
66
 
contributed to Egyptian distrust of the Yemeni military. According to an Egyptian officer 
interviewed in early 1965: ―we can never trust the Yemenis who come to fight on our side… 
[T]hey‘re always likely to turn their fire suddenly against us.‖67 Consequently, Egyptian staff 
officers in charge of Yemeni units limited the amounts and types of weapons they distributed 
to their troops
68
 and the Egyptian command did not trust Yemeni units with information, 
complicating attempts at joint operations. In particular after the Khamr conference of 1965 
and during the Egyptian withdrawal in 1967, Egyptian forces retreated from positions without 
notifying their republican allies, so that Yemeni units awoke to find that Egyptian garrisons 
had disappeared and previously defended positions were now vulnerable.
69
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Tribal lines and divisions lay behind not just Egyptian distrust of the regular military, but also 
behind the decision to bypass the military completely and deal with the tribes directly. In the 
context of the immediate requirements of wartime, buying temporary tribal support, 
intelligence, and acquiescence to operations proved far easier than growing a fickle and 
unreliable central military. The Egyptian command launched a Tribal Affairs Office, which 
began attempts to buy off tribes and established direct relationships between the Egyptian 
command and tribal leaders, eventually embedding intelligence operatives with key tribes.
70
 
The Egyptians significantly increased the financial resources devoted to these efforts after 
1964  with the Egyptian embassy eventually commenting on the ‗fantastic‘ tribal stipends of 
up to YR 200,000 per month it was paying.
71
  
Moreover, because Yemeni republican commanders likewise granted sheikhs funds as 
recruiters and commanders of the auxiliary ‗Popular Forces,‘ a substantial fraction of 
Egyptian payments to the Yemeni military may have made its way to the tribes on top of the 
direct Egyptian payments.
72 
This flow of money and weapons, combined with a similar flow 
of gold and arms from Saudi Arabia and the royalists, meant that many tribes‘ military 
capabilities eventually outstripped those of the regular army, reversing the centralisation of 
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Imams Yahyā and ‘  mad.73 In light of the growing resources at their disposal, alliances 
with tribal leaders and their militias became more and more important for successful military 
operations, particularly after Egyptian withdrawal left the Republican military facing the 
Royalists alone. As a consequence, and particularly in light of internal divisions within the 
officers‘ corps,74 officers with tribal connections became indispensable for the functioning of 
the military. 
4. Egyptian state-building and the development of the YAR administration 
Turning to the state-building legacy in the area of civilian administration, the Egyptians led a 
concerted push to replace the highly personalised administration of the Imam with 
bureaucratic structures, rapidly growing the number and ‗capacity‘ of civil servants  and 
expanding the role of the state in the economy. Yet, these plans collided with existing 
institutions and a wartime situation that provided ready external rents, made working at the 
centre easier than in the insecure peripheries, and provided incentives for Egyptian troops and 
commanders to bypass the new institutions the advisors were creating. As a result, the 
outcomes hardly resembled the blueprints. Nonetheless, the existence of new civilian 
administrative bodies and the mould they were created in cast a long shadow, shaping a 
centralised public administration structured around foreign aid, loosely connected to local 
power brokers through its ability to distribute funds. 
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4.1 New administrative blueprints… 
Within weeks of the overthrow of the Imam, the new republican government invited an 
Egyptian mission to oversee the administrative reform of the state.
75
 This initial mission and 
various ad-hoc additions were followed by a formal cooperation agreement between the UAR 
and the YAR in July 1963. Authorising up to 400 seconded Egyptian civilian experts, the 
agreement permitted cooperation in a wide range of areas from administration, over 
agriculture, religious endowments, security, and justice, to education, health and 
infrastructure. The UAR committed EGP 3 million annually for projects, additional salaries, 
and expenses for seconded experts until the 1964/65 fiscal year, when the budget was 
reduced to EGP 2 million until the Egyptian withdrawal.
76
 
Between 1962 and 1967, Egyptian experts oversaw the building, both in physical and 
organisational terms, of some two-dozen ministries and other government agencies. Within 
six months of the Imam‘s overthrow  they helped to found ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Education, Health, Tribal Affairs, Interior, Justice, Agriculture, Finance, Economy, Labour, 
and Information. More administrative bodies were added later, joined by a currency board, a 
development bank and a Yemeni central bank.
77
 To house these bodies, whose blueprints, 
hierarchies, and procedures were largely imported wholesale from Egypt, Egyptian engineers 
built ―whole streets‖ of modern concrete and plaster block buildings.78  
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Some sort of re-structuring of the government would doubtlessly have taken place without 
the Egyptian presence, but neither would it have occurred at the pace and to the extent that it 
did, nor would the models have been quite as recognisably Egyptian. In contrast to the slow 
growth of the military, the Yemeni bureaucracy expanded dramatically during the Egyptian 
intervention. From about 2,000-4,000 civil servants under the Imamate, most of whom were 
engaged in collecting taxes and many of whom did not find a place in the new bureaucracy, 
the number of civil servants roughly doubled to 6,000 within the first year of the YAR‘s 
existence and continued to expand to 12,500 in 1967 and 13,500 at the end of the civil war. 
During the initial period of growth in the first year after the overthrow of the Imam  officials‘ 
pay tripled.
79
 On a more local level, Egyptian experts likewise oversaw an ambitious reform 
process, spearheading the restructuring of local administration in Yemen. Replacing the 
Ottoman liw ’ (province) system with a system of governorates, modelled on the Egyptian 
one, the new local administration was designed to re-draw the balance of local power 
between the s dah, qu  h and other traditional officials on the one hand and ‗modern‘ 
elements, like the military, on the other.
80
  
Egyptian experts were not above taking an active role in decision making and shaping the 
constitutional order to fit plans formulated in Cairo. The German embassy notes, for instance, 
that Egyptian advisors played a decisive role in drafting the Yemeni constitution of 28 April 
1964, highlighting in particular their role in ensuring that, contrary to the wishes of Nu‗mān, 
al-‘Iryān , and their allies, who were seeking to enshrine more collegiate forms of leadership, 
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the constitution featured a strong presidency under the Egyptians‘ preferred strongman  ‗ bd 
Allah al-Sallāl.81 Egyptian advisers also wielded enormous power in ministries day to day. 
According to the German embassy in Yemen, they were ―present and influential in all 
government bodies and public institutions ‖82 while the former Yemeni Prime Minister, 
Mu sin al-‗ yn , remembers that his colleagues generally deferred to advice provided by 
Egyptian advisors, the most important of whom sat in the office of the ministers themselves.
83
  
When Yemeni politicians sought a measure of independence, the Egyptian command was less 
than thrilled. As al-‗ yn  details in his memoirs, from early 1965 onwards, Yemeni ministers 
were beginning to ignore Egyptian advisors and act on their own authority, moved advisors 
outside of Minister‘s offices, and attempted to keep Soviet equipment used to construct 
Sana‗a airport rather than give it to the Egyptians.84 In response, the Egyptian command 
contemplated Egyptian advisors‘ taking full executive powers in all Yemeni ministries. 
Following a prolonged standoff, they imprisoned most of the government instead, holding a 
score of former Yemeni ministers, including the former Prime Minister, in Egyptian jails, and 
hundreds of influential political figures in gaol in Yemen between October 1966 and the 
Egyptian withdrawal in late 1967.
85
 Concomitantly, Egyptian advisors, military commanders 
and the intelligence forces became more and more involved in the minutiae of Yemeni 
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politics—down to controlling the appointment of local officials and lower-ranking officers.86 
In the final days of 1966, the German embassy in Ta‗iz noted pointedly that it seemed as 
though President al-Sallāl was ―no longer allowed even to breathe without Egyptian 
permission.‖87 
Economic policy likewise had undertones of political control and mercantilist gain. The 
artificially low Egyptian-set exchange rate between Yemeni riyals and Egyptian pounds 
allowed the Egyptian government to recoup expenses from the republican state.
88
 Similarly, 
Egyptian state-owned enterprises controlled most foreign direct investment in Yemen and 
were behind the creation of a number of joint-stock companies, in which the Yemeni partners 
held 51%. Closely affiliated with the Egyptian parent, these joint Yemeni-Egyptian 
companies included the Yemen Foreign Trade Company, Yemen Petroleum Company, 
Yemeni National Tobacco and Matches Company, Yemen Pharmaceutical Company and the 
Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
89
 Yet, despite their near-monopolies on 
cigarettes, cement, steel, pharmaceuticals, and other goods, the Yemeni market was not 
particularly lucrative for Egyptian state-owned enterprises. Although Egyptian exports to 
Yemen grew thirty-fold between 1963 and 1967 to a total value of EGP 3 million per year, 
the Egyptian embassy estimated that Egyptian profits from trade with Yemen reached only 
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approximately 150,000 Pounds Sterling (ca. EGP 180,000) per year, ―equivalent to the 
expenses of a couple of days [of military operations].‖90  
4.2 … and their outcomes 
It is clear that the proliferation of new ministries was bewildering for new and old civil 
servants and the ministers who were supposed to be running them, let alone for citizens trying 
to engage with them.
91
 New bodies interacted with existing, traditional institutions in Yemen 
and the wartime context. As a result, many of the new Egyptian-inspired procedures were 
observed in the breach: A UNDP assessment of Yemeni institutions conducted immediately 
after the end of the civil war in 1971 concluded that: ―administration is personal and 
individual rather than institutional,― complained that ―the organisation structure [of 
ministries] is not appropriate ‖ and criticised ―duplication of functions, overlapping and 
conflicts of jurisdiction‖ between and within institutions.92 At the same time, the mould these 
new institutions had been created in and the existence of new administrative bodies with 
buildings, staff, and budgets had a real and enduring impact on how politics was conducted in 
Yemen, with a dramatic influence on taxation, allocation, and how the political centre 
interacted with localities.  
The total expenditure of the Yemeni government rose dramatically during the Egyptian 
intervention, largely funded by the UAR. Papers from the Egyptian archives discuss a variety 
of loans, import credits and other forms of financial aid, including loans and grants of YR 
100 million for the Yemeni military, at least EGP 10 million (ca. YR 30 million at 1968 
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exchange rates)
93
 for civilian experts, as well as assorted loans to cover Yemeni imports from 
Egypt, the printing of Yemeni banknotes in Cairo, development projects, and other 
expenses.
94
 Large parts of these newly available funds went to the salaries of officers, 
soldiers and, to a lesser extent, new civil servants.
95
 Loans and grants from the USSR, 
People‘s Republic of China, the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany and other donors 
likewise filled government coffers. However, unlike Egyptian budget support, much of these 
funds were earmarked for specific projects and hence could not be used to cover regular 
government expenditure. Nonetheless, thanks to these investments in infrastructure, capital 
expenditure by the Yemeni government rose from next to nothing in 1961 to nearly half of all 
total new investment by the mid-1960s.
96
  
From the Egyptian perspective, reliance on Egyptian funding, though a fiscal drain, was a 
powerful political tool of control. Egypt cut-off funds for the new Nu‘mān government in 
June 1965 to pressure it to re-think its more independent course, and Nasser allegedly 
blocked Kuwaiti funding that would have made up for the shortfall.
97
 Similarly in 1967, 
Egypt froze its programme of loans to ―all Yemeni ministries, associations, bodies and 
companies,‖ when President al-Sallāl refused to cooperate with the provisions of the 
Khartoum Agreement that regulated Egyptian withdrawal in 1967.
98
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Although subject to political interruptions, the scale of this external funding, largely absent 
prior to the ‗September revolution ‘99 reoriented the Y R bureaucracy‘s functions: while 
taxation petered out, ministries gained influence through allocation of these external rents and 
became focal points for lobbying and influencing to determine where hospitals, schools, or 
roads were built.
100
 The powerful vested interests this generated are evident, not least, in the 
unsuccessful attempts by Yemeni governments to limit expenditure after the Egyptians‘ 
withdrawal.
101
 
Of course, in allocating funds and determining the location of new infrastructure, the new 
bureaucracies did not function in the ways intended by advisors and civil servants did not 
follow the procedures imported from Egypt.
102
 Employees who owed their recruitment to 
tribe or region were very much representatives of these groups—traditional connections and 
hierarchies mattered far more than bureaucratic function.
103
 But new ministries meant more 
than just the continuation of traditional forms in new guises and modern buildings, especially 
since much of the money available for investment came in the form of foreign loans and aid. 
Navigating forms, drawing up plans, and finding technocratic justifications for investments 
became important parts of the political game.  
A further corollary of the availability of external funds was that, despite the dramatic 
expansion of the government apparatus, the YAR lacked strong incentives to expand, or even 
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continue, the Imamate‘s taxation, which was notoriously high.104 Though new taxes were 
officially adopted on the Egyptian model, and Egyptian experts were tasked with establishing 
a national budget, efforts to collect taxes faltered. The new republican government turned tax 
collection over to officials at the local level. By all accounts  this system was ―wide open to 
abuse.‖105 There were almost no penalties for evasion and by the end of the civil war as little 
as 5% of agricultural taxes, one of the mainstays of Imamate era government income, were 
actually being collected.
106
 The wartime absence of taxation became the new normal. Instead, 
the generation of government revenues became primarily about securing foreign aid. In the 
context of this political economy, the Egyptian-designed central institutions were concerned 
with accessing foreign funding and connected to the regions primarily by distributing money. 
An overview of government plans for the coming year provided upon request of the German 
embassy in Yemen by the Prime Minister   assan al-‗ mr , in early 1966, is instructive in 
this regard: it consists entirely of a list of foreign-funded projects.107 
If the new administration was centralised and hardly present in many of Yemen‘s regions  
this was also closely connected to the war: the relative ease of building institutions in the 
safety of Sana‗a or Ta‗iz, or implementing development projects far from the front lines in 
‘Ibb or al-Mukhā, as opposed to areas with active fighting. Although Egyptian experts 
designed a new local administration system for Yemen, modelled on the Egyptian,
108
 the 
reform has generally been considered a failure. Even shortly after the end of the civil war, 
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governorate-level institutions existed as stipulated only in Sana‗a, Hudaydah and Ta‗iz. In 
other areas, self-administration was managed by tribes, Imamate-era officials,
109
 or the 
increasingly ubiquitous Local Development Associations,
110
 without governorate or even 
district-level bodies. In the few places where governorate-level structures were created, they 
were dominated by tribal leaders and traditional notables, rather than the ‗modernising‘ 
forces the reform intended to empower.
111
 
Yet, as in the case of other Egyptian reform efforts, to leave it at that would be to miss an 
important part of the story, because new institutions did fundamentally affect the way in 
which local administration functioned, contributing to the formation of neo-patrimonial 
centre-periphery relations and the tribal-military condominium. The funds suddenly available 
at the centre meant that tribal leadership became about securing funding for infrastructure or 
stipends from the Egyptian Tribal Affairs office, the royalists, or the republican government. 
Although this dynamic went largely into abeyance as oil-boom fuelled remittances provided a 
decentralised source of external funds in the 1970s, it would be re-activated in the 1980s.
112
 
Highly centralised ministries created on the Egyptian model negotiated international 
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development projects and loans with external donors and relied for implementation and 
disbursement on local allies, generally tribal leaders. 
One of the few aspects of the local government reform that was more widely implemented 
was the provision that the military commander of each governorate be a serving officer. 
These military commanders in many cases represented the most powerful actor in the 
governorate as the war drew to a close.
113
 They were partially able to take over the role of 
Egyptian military commanders, who, in some areas, had acted as de-facto governors
114
 and 
wielded a great deal of power over discretionary spending on ‗hearts and minds‘ projects, 
such as wells and roads, during the later war years.
115
 Inserting the military directly into 
administration at the local level was to have significant longer-term effects, since with 
increased control over local administration, trade routes and transport infrastructure, military 
officers, in alliance with local tribal leaders, gained access to smuggling and independent 
sources of income.
116
  
5. Conclusion 
Egyptian state-building in Yemen has been described as ―megalomanic,‖117 ―more hindered 
than helped by the fact that the new state was largely built and staffed by Egyptians,‖ and as 
resulting in institutions that were ―empty shells existing in name only.‖ 118 Indeed, as we have 
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seen, Egyptian state-building was hardly an unqualified success in terms of the technocratic 
project that was the dominant way its activities were described and justified. Yet, to dismiss 
the project as a failure, misses its significant impact. In the interplay between the 
contradictory state-building aims of the Egyptian project and the unforeseen consequences 
that emerged as plans encountered local resistance and adaptation, military and civilian 
institutions emerged, whose specific ways of functioning structured Yemeni politics at least 
until unification in 1990.  
In terms of the emerging Yemeni military, the Egyptian intervention was central to a 
significant gain in social standing and political influence for officers. Its impact on the size 
and effectiveness of the military itself was more ambiguous, but it appears to have played a 
role in limiting its growth and ability to operate independently, creating a politically activist 
officer corps at the head of a weak, divided and politicised military reliant on tribal allies. In 
this sense, the intervention and developments during the civil war appear to have helped push 
military officers to the forefront of Yemeni politics and may represent a first important step 
towards the formation of what Paul Dresch later termed the ―tribal-military-commercial 
complex‖119—though that formation owes much also to specific developments under 
President ‗ li  bd  llah Saleh. 
Similarly, the existence of new civilian administrative bodies and the mould they were 
created in cast a long shadow. Although new institutions did not fulfil the goals formulated 
for them by Egyptian experts, the new bureaucracies controlled allocation of growing funds 
and as such became a central focal point for lobbying and influencing. Ministries emerged as 
important instruments of patronage and the privileged interface between local power brokers 
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and international sources of funding. As a result of the civil war and the centralised Egyptian 
state-building project, representatives of the central state largely disappeared from the local 
level—potentially providing the space for the flowering of Local Development Associations 
during the later war years and the 1970s, but also, perhaps, prefiguring the disconnects and 
allocation-led strategies of centralisation and control analysed by students of President 
Saleh‘s Yemen and his politics of co-option and patronage.120 
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